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Searching for a Trademarks Test: The Ninth Circuit’s
Query in Network Automation
I. INTRODUCTION
In Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.,1
the Ninth Circuit changed the direction of its internet trademark law
when it declined to apply the “troika” factors2 to determine whether
one’s use of another’s trademark as a search-engine keyword violates
the Lanham Act.3 The court established the internet troika test in
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.4
and consistently applied it to the internet context for more than a
decade.5 But the Ninth Circuit in Network Automation instead
favored a flexible application of an eight-factor test from its earlier
decision in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats.6 The court used this flexible
application to produce a new test made up of three Sleekcraft factors
distinct from the troika combined with a fourth new factor.7
The Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Network Automation are flawed
for two reasons. First, because the district court properly applied
Ninth Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the
district court applied an erroneous legal standard. Second, the Ninth
Circuit failed to limit clearly the troika test and to define the
appropriate contexts for its future use. These flaws create confusion
about which test applies in trademark infringement cases for
emerging technologies. This Note examines the Ninth Circuit’s
method of crafting new tests for cases involving new internet

1. 638 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011).
2. The troika test consists of the following three factors: “(1) the similarity of the
marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods or services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web as
a marketing channel.” Id. at 1148. The three troika factors are a subset of the eight factors
established in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
4. 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 n.16 (9th Cir. 1999).
5. See, e.g., Perfumebay.com v. eBay, 506 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
6. 599 F.2d at 348–49.
7. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1154
(9th Cir. 2011). None of the Sleekcraft factors in the new test are a part of the troika. Id.
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technologies and offers a model that judges can follow in future
emerging-technology cases.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II details trademark case law
from the online keyword search context. Part III contains the
relevant facts and procedural history of Network Automation. Part IV
describes the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and holding. Finally, Part V
analyzes Network Automation, explains the difficulties caused by the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, and proposes a clear method for judges to
determine which factors are relevant in future internet trademark
cases.
II. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
To demonstrate infringement of a registered trademark under
the Lanham Act,8 a party “must prove (1) that it has a protectable
ownership interest in the mark; and (2) that the defendant’s use of
the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.”9 While trademark
law prohibits multiple types of confusion, two types are relevant in
the online keyword context: source confusion and initial interest
confusion.10 Source confusion occurs when a consumer is confused
about the source or origin of a product.11 Initial interest confusion
occurs when a consumer initially becomes interested in a product
based on confusion about the product’s origin, even if the
misunderstanding is resolved before the consumer’s purchase.12
In AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,13 the Ninth Circuit established a
test that considers eight relevant factors for determining likelihood of
confusion for purposes of trademark infringement. The relevant
factors are: “(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods;
(3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5)
marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care
likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in
selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product

8. 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
9. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v.
Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006)).
10. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062
(9th Cir. 1999).
11. See id.
12. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th
Cir. 1997).
13. 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979).
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lines.”14 Courts consider these factors in light of “all the relevant
circumstances in assessing the likelihood of confusion.”15 This test
has become foundational in assessing the likelihood of confusion in
all trademark cases in the Ninth Circuit.
In Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment,16 the
Ninth Circuit “first confronted issues of trademark infringement and
consumer confusion in the Internet context.”17 In Brookfield, a
provider of entertainment-industry information sued a video-rental
store for its internet-related use of the term “MovieBuff,” including
“moviebuff.com.”18 The Ninth Circuit applied the Sleekcraft test,
noting that it is “pliant,” that “the relative importance of each
individual factor will be case-specific,” and that it may be possible to
use “only a subset of the factors” or use “non-listed variables.”19
However, the Ninth Circuit also acknowledged that “some factors—
such as the similarity of the marks and whether the two companies
are direct competitors—will always be important.”20
Of the eight factors in Sleekcraft, the Ninth Circuit primarily
relied on three factors, which would come to be known as the
internet “troika,” in holding that there was a likelihood of
confusion.21 The first factor is the similarity of the marks: “[T]he
more similar the marks in terms of appearance, sound, and meaning,
the greater the likelihood of confusion.”22 The second factor is the
relatedness of the goods or services. This factor examines whether
the two parties are competitors as well as “the competitive proximity
of their products.”23 The third factor is simultaneous use of the web
as a marketing channel.24 In addition to these three factors, the

14. Id.
15. Id. at 348 (citing Durox Co. v. Duron Paint Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 882, 885 (4th Cir.
1963)).
16. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
17. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1145
(9th Cir. 2011).
18. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1041.
19. Id. at 1054.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1058.
22. Id. at 1054 (citing Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127,
1131 (9th Cir. 1998); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir.
1993)).
23. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1056.
24. Id. at 1057.
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Ninth Circuit offered the following guidance: “We must be acutely
aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet
context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”25 The
Ninth Circuit applied these factors to the domain name context,
holding that “moviebuff.com” was confusingly similar to
“MovieBuff,” and accordingly enjoined West Coast’s use of
“moviebuff.com.”26
The Brookfield court also considered a different but related
question: Is it permissible for one to use another’s trademark in a
website’s metatags?27 Metatags, hidden from a typical viewer, are
keywords buried in the HTML code of a website that assist search
engines in indexing website content.28 While acknowledging that
source confusion was unlikely to result from one’s use of another’s
trademark in metatags to affect search engine results, the Ninth
Circuit noted that initial interest confusion may nevertheless exist.29
The court clarified its reasoning regarding metatags in the trademark
context with this hypothetical:
Suppose West Coast’s competitor (let’s call it “Blockbuster”) puts
up a billboard on a highway reading—”West Coast Video: 2 miles
ahead at Exit 7”—where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West
Coast’s store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it.
Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right
by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there.30

Even though consumers “are fully aware” in the end that they
are renting from Blockbuster and not West Coast, “the fact that
there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that
Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast’s acquired
goodwill.”31 This initial interest confusion alone was sufficient for
the Brookfield court to bar the use of trademarked terms in metatags

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
See Jonathan Moskin, Virtual Trademark Use—The Parallel World of Keyword Ads,
98 TRADEMARK REP. 873, 887 (2008). Google and other modern search engines rarely still
use metatags in their search engine algorithms. Id.
29. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1062.
30. Id. at 1064.
31. Id.
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in addition to domain names.32 However, the court did not
completely bar the use of a competitor’s trademarked terms in the
internet context.33 A trademarked term can still be used to describe a
competitor’s product.34 For example, it would be acceptable for West
Coast to display a web advertisement stating, “Why pay for
MovieBuff when you can get the same thing here for FREE?”35
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit considered a new search
advertising technology involving the use of trademarked terms in
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.36 In this
case, Netscape required adult-oriented advertisers to link their
banner ads to a list of over 400 adult and sexually oriented terms,
including two terms trademarked by Playboy, “playboy” and
“playmate.”37 The Ninth Circuit, relying on Brookfield, found that
Netscape’s use of trademarked terms created initial interest confusion
and therefore was actionable.38 The court reasoned that “actual
confusion is at the heart of the likelihood of confusion analysis,”39
but still applied the eight-factor Sleekcraft test.40 It held that the
strength of the mark, proximity of the goods, similarity of the marks,
type of goods and degree of consumer care expected, and
defendant’s intent all favored a holding of likelihood of
infringement.41
In Perfumebay.com v. eBay, the Ninth Circuit made clear that the
troika factors are the most important for determining likelihood of
confusion “[i]n the internet context.”42 Perfumebay.com sought a
declaratory judgment that “Perfumebay” did not infringe on the

32. Id.
33. Id. at 1066.
34. See id. (Use of a trademarked term for comparative advertising is considered fair
use.).
35. Id.
36. 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). Playboy’s suit was based on Netscape’s practice of
“keying.” Keying was a practice used by advertisers to display banner ads that were linked to
internet searches by “keying” their ads to certain lists of words. When a search engine user
entered a term from a list, the banner ads keyed to that list would be displayed. Id. at 1022.
37. Id. at 1023.
38. Id. at 1025.
39. Id. at 1027.
40. Id. at 1026–29.
41. Id. at 1027–29.
42. 506 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007).
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“eBay” mark.43 One eBay employee testified that searches for the
keywords “perfume eBay” elicited sponsored ads for Perfumebay’s
website.44 The Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]n the internet context,
‘the three most important Sleek craft factors in evaluating a
likelihood of confusion are’” the troika factors.45 The court also
noted that the eight-factor Sleekcraft test, which “guides the
assessment of whether a likelihood of confusion exists,”46 should be
fluid.47 The court held that because these “three most important”
factors—the “internet trilogy”—weighed against Perfumebay, there
was a valid basis for initial interest confusion. 48 As a result, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the district court’s permanent injunction against
using perfumebay.com and perfume-bay.com.49
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts of the Case
Advanced Systems Concepts (“Systems”) is a software
development and consulting firm that developed the ActiveBatch
software, an enterprise software product that assists businesses with
centralized task management.50 Systems began using the ActiveBatch
trademark in 2000 and registered the mark with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office in 2001.51 Network Automation (“Network”),
also a software development firm, is a direct competitor of Systems.52
Network developed the AutoMate software, which is also an
enterprise software program for integrating and automating various

43. Id. at 1168.
44. Id. at 1170.
45. Id. at 1173 (quoting Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936,
942 (9th Cir. 2002)). The troika factors are “(1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness
of the goods and services, and (3) the parties’ simultaneous use of the web as a marketing
channel.” Id.
46. Id. (citing Reno Air Racing Ass’n. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir.
2006)).
47. Id. (citing Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir.
2005)).
48. Id. at 1173–74.
49. Id. at 1176–77.
50. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1142
(9th Cir. 2011).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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business tasks, applications, and technologies.53 AutoMate directly
competes with ActiveBatch.54
Network used Google AdWords and Microsoft adCenter to
display ads each time a user searched for the keyword
“ActiveBatch.”55 Google56 AdWords is a program that allows a
website owner to create ads and choose the “keywords,” or search
terms, that trigger the display of those ads.57 Keyword-specific
advertising allows advertisers to target their ads based on users’
search terms. Google pitches the program as a way to “advertis[e] to
an audience that’s already interested.”58 When a user clicks on an ad,
the user is redirected to a website pre-designated by the advertiser,
and Google charges the advertiser for the click.59 Microsoft’s Bing
search engine offers a similar service called adCenter.60 Google or
Bing61 users who searched for the keyword “ActiveBatch,”62 a
trademark owned by Systems, were shown Network’s ad in a
“Sponsored Links” or “Sponsored Sites” section of the search results
page.63 Network’s advertisements included text such as “Job
Scheduler” or “Batch Job Scheduling,” and also included the
company’s website, NetworkAutomation.com.64
In November 2009, Systems demanded that Network stop using
the ActiveBatch mark in search engine advertising because Network
was “not ‘authorized to use’” the ActiveBatch mark in commerce.65

53. Id.; see also NETWORK AUTOMATION, http://www.networkautomation.com (last
visited Mar. 9, 2011).
54. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1142.
55. Id.
56. Google’s market share of the desktop search engine was 78% as of Mar. 9, 2012.
Search Engine Market Share, NETMARKETSHARE, http://www.netmarketshare.com/searchengine-market-share.aspx?qprid=4 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
57. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1142.
58. GOOGLE ADWORDS, https://adwords.google.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
59. Id.
60. MICROSOFT ADVERTISING ADCENTER, https://adcenter.microsoft.com/ (last
visited Mar. 9, 2012).
61. While the case made no mention of other search engines, the Ninth Circuit has
previously recognized that Yahoo!, Altavista, and Lycos are examples of other internet search
engines. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045
(9th Cir. 1999).
62. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1143.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Systems argued that Network’s keyword advertising infringed on its
mark.66 In response, Network filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory
judgment of non infringement.67 Systems counterclaimed, alleging
trademark infringement and moving for a preliminary injunction
against Network.68
B. Procedural History
The district court granted System’s injunction against Network,
holding that Network infringed on System’s trademark because
Network used the mark in commerce.69 While the district court
considered all eight factors of the Sleekcraft test, it followed Ninth
Circuit precedent regarding internet cases and focused on the three
troika factors: “(1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of
the goods or services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the web as a
marketing channel.”70 The district court found that all three factors
weighed in favor of Systems.71 It also concluded that three other
Sleekcraft factors weighed in favor of Systems and that the remaining
two did not apply.72 The district court found that Network’s
keyword advertising was impermissible because it created “initial
interest confusion.”73 Because of these findings, the district court
concluded that Systems was likely to prevail on its trademark
infringement claim, that Systems would suffer irreparable harm, and
that the public interest favored Systems.74 The district court granted
a preliminary injunction based on these findings.75 Network then
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.76

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. These three factors are known as the “troika” test or the “internet trilogy.”
71. Id. at 1143–44.
72. Id. at 1149–54. The others factors that weighed in favor of Systems were (1) the
strength of the mark, (2) type of goods and degree of care, and (3) defendant’s intent. Id. The
factors that did not apply were (1) evidence of actual confusion, and (2) likelihood of
expansion of the product lines. Id.
73. Id. at 1144. Note that the district court found “initial interest confusion” instead of
finding “source confusion.”
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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IV. THE COURT’S DECISION

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that there
was a likelihood of confusion.77 The district court abused its
discretion by erroneously relying on the troika factors when it should
have been more flexible and applied all of the Sleekcraft factors.78
The Ninth Circuit combined its own step-by-step analysis of all eight
Sleekcraft factors with its consideration of other relevant factors to
articulate a new test for search–keyword cases.79 Applying this new
test, the court held that there was no likelihood of confusion in this
case.80
A. What Test to Apply
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s application of the
troika factors as overly rigid. It noted, “We must be acutely aware of
excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context;
emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”81 Explaining that
“it makes no sense to prioritize the same three factors for every type
of potential online commercial activity,” the court rejected the troika
factors for application in this context.82 The Ninth Circuit held that
the appropriate analysis instead includes a flexible application of all
the Sleekcraft factors, as well as an examination of the surrounding
circumstances.83 The court declared that this test should be applied
with an eye to the “sine qua non84 of trademark infringement”–
“consumer confusion.”85
After analyzing all eight Sleekcraft factors,86 the court concluded
that a new test was more relevant for this context. The factors in the
Ninth Circuit’s new test included three Sleekcraft factors, all distinct
from the troika factors: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the
77. Id. at 1154.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1149–54.
80. Id. at 1154.
81. Id. at 1141–42 (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174
F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999)).
82. Id. at 1148.
83. Id. at 1149.
84. Sine qua non means an essential element or condition. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1418 (8th ed. 2004).
85. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149.
86. Id. at 1149–54.
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evidence of actual confusion; and (3) the type of goods and degree
of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser.87 Additionally, the
court added a fourth, new factor, (4) the labeling and appearance of
the advertisements and the surrounding context on the screen
displaying the results page.88
B. The Application of the Test
After evaluating the significance of each Sleekcraft factor, the
Ninth Circuit determined whether each factor favored a finding of
likelihood of confusion.89 While the court did not explicitly conclude
whether there was a likelihood of confusion, its step-by-step analysis
of the Sleekcraft factors suggests that the balance of the factors
weighed against holding that confusion was likely.90 The Ninth
Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s grant of the injunction91 also
indicates that the court felt confusion was unlikely.92
V. ANALYSIS
In Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit made a distinct shift
in its approach to trademark law on the internet. This shift is
problematic because rather than acknowledging and explaining its
break with precedent, the Ninth Circuit merely redefined prior case
law, which changed the direction of the law without actually
overturning cases. The result is an unclear standard that will leave
judges and practitioners confused and unsure about the correct
approach to trademark law and emerging technologies.
A. The District Court’s Approach Was Not Clearly Erroneous
The district court’s approach, which the Ninth Circuit
overturned under the abuse of discretion standard, was not
unreasonable in light of case law and Ninth Circuit precedent. The

87. Id. at 1154.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1149–54.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1154.
92. One of the factors that must be established in order for a court to grant a
preliminary injunction is the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits. Winter v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Thus the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the
injunction implies that the Ninth Circuit did not agree that Systems was likely to prevail.
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district court analyzed each of the Sleekcraft factors, but identified
Brookfield’s troika as the most important because this was an
“Internet” case.93 The Ninth Circuit claimed that this was an
erroneous legal standard, pointing to Brookfield’s single use of the
word “flexible” as evidence that the troika test was not meant to
apply to all internet-related cases.94 Determining whether Brookfield
applies to all internet cases is unnecessary because in this case, the
facts are quite analogous to those of Brookfield. The Brookfield court,
in analyzing the use of trademark terms in metatags, specifically
noted that if an infringer’s use of a competitor’s trademark affects
search engine results, thereby attracting additional website visitors,
the infringer’s actions create initial interest confusion.95
Moreover, there seems to be little difference between the
technologies at issue in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp.96 and Network Automation,97 which suggests
that there should be little difference in the legal outcomes. In
Playboy, Netscape’s search-engine results displayed banner ads that
had been linked to lists of words.98 Because those lists included
trademarked terms, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there was
“strong support” for “a high likelihood of initial interest
confusion.”99 The Ninth Circuit analyzed all eight Sleekcraft factors,
but found “evidence of actual confusion” to be the most
important.100 In Network Automation, although the underlying
technology was slightly different,101 the search engine results still
displayed ads in response to trademarked search terms. Because
trademark law is focused on what the consumer experiences or

93. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148.
94. Id. at 1145–46.
95. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th
Cir. 1999).
96. 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
97. In Network Automation, an advertiser paid to display a text ad in response to a
search for a trademarked term (the keyword). 638 F.3d at 1143. In Playboy, an advertiser paid
to display a banner ad in response to a search for one of a list of words, at least one of which
was a trademarked term. 354 F.3d at 1023.
98. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1023.
99. Id. at 1026–27.
100. Id. at 1026–29.
101. In Playboy, the trademarked term was part of a list of words “keyed” to display
banner ads in response to a search including a word on a list. In Network Automation, the ad
corresponded directly to an individual term.
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believes,102 and in both cases the consumer experiences a similar
result, it hardly seems erroneous for the district court in Network
Automation to come to a similar conclusion as Playboy. Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit even recognized that there was “similarity” between
Network Automation, Playboy, and Brookfield.103 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the district court under the abuse of
discretion standard was inappropriate.
Given how similar the facts of Perfumebay were to those of
Network Automation, it hardly seems erroneous for the district court,
in each case, to apply a similar standard and reach a similar outcome.
In both cases, a search that included one party’s trademarked term
resulted in the display of a competitor’s paid advertisements for their
competing product alongside the search results.104 Examining these
facts in Perfumebay, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]n the internet
context, ‘the three most important Sleekcraft factors in evaluating a
likelihood of confusion’” are the troika factors from Brookfield.105 A
mere four years later, the district court in Network Automation
followed the Ninth Circuit’s approach and applied the troika factors
“in the internet context”106—a statement that hardly seems
ambiguous at all.
Because the district court’s decision was in line with Ninth
Circuit precedent, it is difficult to understand how the Ninth Circuit
could hold that the district court’s approach was based on “an
erroneous legal standard”107 without overturning the case law on
which the district court’s decision was based. The abuse of discretion
standard does give some deference to lower court judges. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit in Network Automation had to find “an erroneous
legal standard or . . . clearly erroneous findings of fact” in order to
reverse the district court on abuse of discretion grounds.108 The
district court could not have abused its discretion in this case since its

102. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
Yale L.J. 882, 908 (2007) (“Consumer perception is trademark law’s touchstone.”).
103. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1147
(9th Cir. 2011).
104. Perfumebay.com, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004).
105. Id. at 1173–74 (emphasis added) (citing Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix,
Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2002)).
106. Id. at 1173.
107. Network Automation, 633 F.3d at 1144.
108. Id.
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decision was in line with the Ninth Circuit’s long history of applying
the troika factors in a variety of internet cases—including search
engine cases.109 Because the district court’s approach was the one
favored by precedent, in reversing the district court’s approach under
the abuse of discretion standard, it seems that the mistake was not
actually on the part of the district court, but was in fact a result of
the Ninth Circuit’s own misstep in establishing an “erroneous legal
standard” for internet trademark law to begin with.
B. The New Rule: Wait, Which Rule Applies?
In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit muddied the
water regarding the appropriate standard that should be applied
going forward. While the court explicitly rejected the troika
approach for keyword cases,110 it failed to limit the troika test’s
application in general. This failure to clearly define when the troika
test applies–and when it does not apply–will likely cause confusion
among practitioners and judges in future cases when they must
decide what test is proper. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit failed to
clearly establish a test for district courts to apply when faced with
new emerging technologies in the context of trademark
infringement.
1. When troika applies
In Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the
troika factors for “search engine keyword advertising.”111 Although
the court clearly approved the test for “analyz[ing] the risk of source
confusion generated by similar domain names” and “disputes
involving websites with similar names or appearances,”112 the court
did not limit the test to these situations.
The court’s rationale for rejecting the troika factors in keywordadvertising cases is flawed. To support its proposition that “the
‘troika’ is a particularly poor fit for the question presented” in
Network Automation, the court cited a single journal article.113 The

109. For example, the district court referenced Brookfield and Playboy in its decision to
apply the troika standard in Network Automation. Id. at 1148.
110. Id. at 1148–49.
111. Id. at 1149.
112. Id. at 1148.
113. Id. at 1148–49. The referenced article is Jonathan Moskin, Virtual Trademark
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court characterized the article as “arguing that the ‘troika’ is
inadequate for . . . search engine keyword advertising because it
omits important factors.”114 But the court’s reliance on this article is
curious. If a test is inadequate, the logical fix is to add whatever is
missing so that the test becomes adequate.115 Instead, the court
completely rejected—rather than supplemented—the troika factors,
then replaced them with three different Sleekcraft factors116 and a
fourth factor never before seen117 in the Ninth Circuit.118 The court’s
grasping citation to authority confused—rather than clarified—its
decision. Instead, the court should have clearly stated the logical
reasons that made the troika test inapposite, not merely inadequate.
Because the Ninth Circuit did not overturn precedent, yet still broke
with it, the court’s reasoning is confusing and offers little assistance
to those wishing to apply Network Automation to future cases.
Flexibility would not have changed the district court’s outcome,
despite the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the district court applied
the wrong legal standard because it failed to be flexible in weighing
the Sleekcraft factors.119 In determining whether the troika was
applicable to this case, the district court did examine all of the

Use—The Parallel World of Keyword Ads, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 873, 892–93 (2008).
114. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149 (emphasis added).
115. Adding additional factors to the troika, instead of selecting new ones, would be
more logical because the article cited by the Ninth Circuit characterized the troika as
“inadequate . . . because it omits important factors,” not because it is wholly inapplicable. See
supra note 113 and accompanying text.
116. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154. The Sleekcraft factors that the Ninth
Circuit deemed to be most relevant to the facts of this case were (1) the strength of the mark;
(2) the evidence of actual confusion; and (3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be
exercised by the purchaser. Id. Note that the fourth factor that the court considered relevant in
Network Automation, the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding
context on the screen displaying the results page, was not an original Sleekcraft factor. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
117. It is common for appellate courts to develop case law. The bigger problem here is
the rejection of all three troika factors without sufficient support.
118. The Ninth Circuit cited the nonbinding Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F.
Supp. 2d 274, 289 (D. Mass. 2009) as the basis for its fourth factor: “the labeling and
appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding context on the screen displaying the
results page.” Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154. The court noted one fact from its own
case, Playboy, which was consistent with the new factor: “Netscape’s search engine did not
clearly segregate the sponsored advertisements from the objective results.” Id. However, the
Ninth Circuit did not use that factor to decide Playboy. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape
Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
119. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154.
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Sleekcraft factors.120 Brookfield, which established the troika test,
allowed for “the remaining factors” outside of the troika to “tip the
scale back the other way.”121 The district court considered troika’s
built-in flexibility when applying it, but the Ninth Circuit still
rejected the district court’s findings, implying that the district court
simply “count[ed] beans.”122 This rejection seems to indicate that
what the Ninth Circuit really wished for in its call for “flexibility”
was for different factors to be considered so as to reach a different
outcome.
The safest approach for practitioners and judges going forward is
to apply the troika test only when a case’s fact patterns match exactly
with prior case law, and to tread carefully otherwise.123 It ought to be
clear that in any case, “flexibility” should carry the day. But the best
alternative is simply to undertake a complete Sleekcraft analysis,
considering both the applicability of individual factors and the total
number of factors weighing for or against a holding of likelihood of
confusion. Keeping the flexible approach bounded within Sleekcraft
would provide adaptability for future technologies as well as
guidance for those seeking to apply the law.
2. Determining the law for future technologies
Flexibility sounds nice, particularly when the legal standard will
be applied to as yet unknown future contexts. But in reality flexibility
is unworkable.124 For example, when the district court in Network
Automation applied the test the Ninth Circuit had previously used in
the “internet context,”125 its decision was overturned because it was
120. Id. at 1149–53.
121. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1058 (9th
Cir. 1999).
122. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1145 (citing Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v.
SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998)).
123. This Note argues that the district court’s decision to apply the troika in Network was
in line with precedent, yet the Ninth Circuit still rejected the district court’s reasoning. This
should cause alarm to those who wish to similarly apply the troika in future Ninth Circuit
cases.
124. Practitioners and courts operate in the real world, where objective standards must be
available to measure actual fact patterns against. For example, in Network Automation, the
Ninth Circuit’s “flexibility” resulted in the creation of an entirely new test, which included a
new, never before applied (in the Ninth Circuit) factor. 638 F.3d at 1154. This is difficult for
practitioners and judges because before the test is created, they have no guidance as to how to
apply the law.
125. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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not “flexible” in applying the Sleekcraft factors. What the Ninth
Circuit then did was weigh the Sleekcraft factors in a totally new
way–and additionally invent a completely new factor–all in the name
of “flexibility”. To expect a district court to do the same when faced
with some future, novel application is simply asking too much. If
flexibility is to include modifying or expanding current tests, the
Ninth Circuit should have definitively established a method for
district courts to follow in the future.126
Even though the Ninth Circuit failed to explicitly outline an
approach for what standard applies when district courts are faced
with questions involving new technology, the method that the court
used to develop the four factor standard for keyword advertising is
illustrative.127 First, the court undertook a step-by-step analysis of the
eight Sleekcraft factors, determining one-by-one which factors would
be most relevant for the issue at hand.128 This analysis of the
Sleekcraft factors is to be done “flexibly,” remaining “acutely aware
of excessive rigidity.”129 Second, the court examined “other relevant
factors.”130 The court focused on the circumstances—considering
both “what the consumer saw on the screen” and what “[the
consumer] reasonably believed.”131 By considering whether equity,
common sense, or the surrounding circumstances might prompt a
different outcome than the one that the Sleekcraft factors might
otherwise offer, one may discover those additional relevant factors.132

126. When a new technology emerges that has never been dealt with in the case law, the
normal approach is for district courts to examine how the law has dealt with similar
technologies in the past. The Ninth Circuit completely rejected the district court’s test in
Network Automation, saying that it should have known to use a different test. This section
discusses the approach the Ninth Circuit implied district courts should take to know how to
determine or develop the appropriate test in the future.
127. In Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit applied a brand new factor, never before
used in the Ninth Circuit. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. In order for district
courts to create new factors in the name of “flexibility,” they need some kind of standard
approach to follow in doing so.
128. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149.
129. Id. at 1141, 1145 (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp.,
174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999)).
130. Id. at 1153–54.
131. Id.
132. Ideally, a court should devise a test and apply it consistently no matter the outcome.
If the court decides the test based on the outcome, outcomes will constantly be unpredictable
and ever changing. However, when a test is not a rigid one, the test will necessarily be more
pliable. In internet trademark cases like Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit called for
flexibility in applying the Sleekcraft factors. With flexibility as a high priority, it seems as
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The court’s statement that “the linchpin of trademark infringement
is consumer confusion”133 should prove helpful in considering what
the outcome of a given case should be, and what factors to apply to
achieve that equitable outcome.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit erred in reversing the district court, as the
district court correctly relied on analogous precedent to find that a
likelihood of initial interest confusion existed in the context of
search-engine keyword advertising. The Ninth Circuit’s holding is
troubling not because of the court’s new approach to internet
trademark law, but rather because in failing to explicitly reject the
precedents that the district court followed to reach its conclusion,
the Ninth Circuit left unanswered the question of when to use the
troika test going forward. While the new test is clearly to be used to
determine outcomes for trademark issues in the context of internet
search-engine keywords, the troika test still stands as good law that
could potentially be applied in future, yet to be determined “internet
context[s].”134
Furthermore, even though the Ninth Circuit rejected the lower
court’s approach, it failed to explicitly provide a method to use when
developing new legal standards for emerging technologies. Despite
neglecting to define a methodology for determining which factors to
consider in trademark cases involving new technology, the court’s
reasoning suggests one possibility: (1) examine all eight Sleekcraft
factors using a flexible approach; and (2) examine the surrounding
circumstances, context, and consumers’ actual beliefs to determine
what, if any, additional factors ought to be considered. A clearly
defined approach would give needed guidance to practitioners and

though equity, common sense, or surrounding circumstances must dictate, at least in part,
what additional factors ought to be considered in any particular case, particularly one involving
new technology.
133. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154.
134. Perfumebay.com, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2007).
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judges who must apply the Ninth Circuit’s “flexibility” standard to
real-world situations.
R. Gregory Israelsen*

 J.D. candidate, April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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